What’s Wrong With Cybersecurity Technology?

Veteran software developer David A. Kruger offered some thoughts on computer security recently at Expensivity and we appreciate the opportunity to republish them here. He starts with “Root Cause Analysis 101”

David A. Kruger

Now we’ll apply the lessons learned in yesterday’s discussion to cybersecurity:

Lesson Learned 1: A pattern of multiple types of recurring related failures indicates the presence of an unidentified root cause.

In cybersecurity, is there a pattern of multiple types of recurring failures that appear to be related? Yes! A cybersecurity failure occurs whenever a cyberattacker gains control of data and then:  1) views or plays it, 2) steals copies of it, 3) ransoms it, 5) impedes its flow, 5) corrupts it, or 6) destroys it. The lesson learned is that the target of cyberattacks isn’t networks, computers, or users; they are vectors (pathways) to the target—gaining control of data.

Lesson Learned 2: If repeated fixes fail to stop recurring failures, it indicates fixes are being applied to intermediate causes (symptoms), rather than to the root cause.

In cybersecurity, is there evidence of the symptomatic solution fallacy? In other words, is there a history of applying fixes to recurring related failures only to have the failures continue to occur? The answer is an emphatic yes. Successful cyberattacks keep on happening.

Groundhog Day

Why aren’t symptomatic solutions able to permanently solve cybersecurity failures?  Because it’s mathematically impossible for them to do so.  Don’t take my word for it; you can prove it to yourself with a simple thought experiment.

Compute “total cyberattack potential:”

  1. Identify vulnerabilities: Identify every type of user, hardware, software, and network vulnerability that can be exploited to gain control of data. To provide some scope, there are currently nearly 170,000 publicly disclosed cybersecurity vulnerabilities with new ones being discovered all the time.
  2. Count vulnerability instances: Add up the total number of users, networks and instances of software and hardware that have the vulnerabilities identified in step 1.
  3. For every vulnerability instance, identify and count every vector or combination of vectors a cyberattacker can take to exploit the vulnerability.
  4. Multiply vulnerabilities by their vectors to compute “total cyberattack potential.”

Now compute “total cyderdefense potential:”

  1. Identify every currently available type of defense, including technological defenses and human defenses such as cybersecurity training and education.
  2. Subtract unerected defenses due to apathy, ignorance, or a lack of trained personnel, money, or time.
  3. Subtract unerected defenses that don’t yet exist due to the lag time between discovering a vulnerability and developing a defense for it.
  4. Subtract unerected defenses arising from vulnerabilities known to cyberattackers but unknown to cyberdefenders.
  5. Subtract properly erected defenses that cyberattackers have learned to defeat.
  6. Subtract defenses that fail because they were improperly implemented.
A computer popup box screen warning of a system being hacked, compromised software environment. 3D illustration.

It easy to see that there is far more total attack potential than defense potential, but we’re not nearly finished.

  1. Factor in that cyberwarfare is immensely asymmetrical. If a cyberdefender scores 1,000,000 and a cyberattacker scores 1, the cyberattacker wins.
  2. Factor in that the rate of asymmetry grows as the number of connected devices grows.  Defense potential grows linearly since symptomatic point solutions are implemented individually, whereas, attack potential grows exponentially due to network effectThink of an ever-expanding game of Whac-A-Mole where new holes and moles appear faster and faster, but kids with mallets only appear at a constant rate and you’ve got the picture. That tends to make cybersecurity successes temporary, as in unable to guarantee success against tomorrow’s attack even if successful today. For example: Someone at your company (or maybe you) buys a smart refrigerator. Later, via a new smart refrigerator exploit, the refrigerator’s software, which your company has no control over, is the initial vector that ultimately results in the theft of company intellectual property. The refrigerator, a single node added to an employee’s home network, negates the efficacy of all the company’s point solutions even if they all worked perfectly, not to mention diminishing the value of prior cybersecurity expenditures.
  3. Factor in that cybersecurity is truly democratic; the enemy gets a vote. Cyberattacker strategies, tactics, target valuations, and target selections are based on their cost-benefit analysis, not yours.
  4. Finally, factor in that defense is far more expensive than attack with respect to time, money, and trained personnel because it’s much easier to automate and distribute attacks than defenses. A relatively small number of cyberattackers can create work for a much larger number of cyberdefenders.

Accordingly, it’s not possible to calculate risk or a credible return on investment for implementing symptomatic point solutions. In its simplest formulation, risk = likelihood x consequences. It’s not possible to calculate the likelihood of being successfully cyberattacked because it’s not possible to know what exploitable vectors and vulnerabilities remain unprotected after implementing symptomatic point solutions.  

In a successful cyberattack, the attacker has control of your data, so it’s impossible to predict the consequences. You can’t know with certainty what they are going to do with your data, nor can you know with certainty how much third parties like customers, courts, and regulators might penalize you for failing to keep cyberattackers from gaining control of your data. So, when a symptomatic point solution provider claims that buying their stuff will reduce your risk or provide a quantifiable return on investment, it’s meaningless marketing hype. That being said, at the present, symptomatic point solutions do provide a benefit by preventing some unknowable number of cyberattacks from succeeding. However, they are by their nature mitigative, not curative.

Key Point: Today’s multibillion-dollar cybersecurity industry is based on a symptomatic point solution fallacy.

Key Point: Organizations and individuals can’t implement a sufficient number and variety of symptomatic point solutions quickly enough to achieve anything approaching a permanent solution.

Key Point: The aggregate efficacy of symptomatic point solutions cannot be quantified or predicted, so return on investment cannot be calculated.

Key Point Symptomatic point solutions are of inherently limited efficacy, and while they are currently necessary, they can only be stopgap measures. As a result, cybersecurity success based on symptomatic point solutions is a crapshoot.  

Lesson Learned 3:  It is axiomatic that neglecting to compensate for a known operating condition in the design is nearly always the root cause.

We know that cybersecurity failure is the result of a cyberattacker gaining control of data and doing things with it that its rightful owner didn’t intend. That makes it clear that there is something about data that permits cyberattackers to gain control of it, so deduction starts by asking “What are the relevant properties of data, and how is it controlled?”  

Next: Necessary ingredients for cybersecurity that works

Here is the first segment in the series:

The true cause of cybersecurity failure and how to fix it Hint: The cause and fix are not what you think. David A. Kruger, a member of the Forbes Technology Council, says it’s getting worse: We’re in a hole so stop digging! Get back to root cause analysis.

What’s Wrong With Cybersecurity Technology?

Erlando F Rasatro

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